Publications

Melinda Haas, “Origins of Oversight: Covert Action Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Vol. 36, No. 4 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2022.2119446 (published online Sep. 2022).

The National Security Act of 1947 enabled the CIA to “to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.” Although intended to establish the Central Intelligence Agency’s control over the collection of clandestine foreign intelligence, this language was vague enough to authorize other covert operations (psychological, political, and paramilitary) at the direction of the NSC. Attempts at covert action oversight gained traction only after the exposure of unacknowledged CIA activities. The term “covert action” was not defined in legislation until the 1990s. This article categorizes congressional attempts to establish the parameters and regulate covert action both in terms of prohibiting or enabling such action and of enacting substantive or procedural rules. The success of such attempts has depended heavily on the extent of bipartisan support in Congress. Congress is more likely to choose substantive laws when faced with recent intelligence scandals, and Congress is less likely to create prohibitive laws as bipartisan support increases. These trends are supported by the legislative history of the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act and the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.

Melinda Haas and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “To Disclose or Deceive? Sharing Secret Information between Aligned States,” International Security, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Winter 2020/21), pp. 122–161, http://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00402. Appendix: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PVLBYU.

Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their military plans to use force, while other times they choose to deceive their partners? The state initiating these plans may choose among four information-sharing strategies: collusion, compartmentalization, concealment, and lying. Three main considerations shape these decisions: the state’s assessment of whether it needs its partner’s capabilities to succeed at the military mission, the state’s perception of whether the partner will be willing to support the state in the requested role, and the state’s anticipated deception costs for not fully informing its partner state. Four cases illustrate how these strategies are chosen: Israel, Britain, and France’s decision to use force against Egypt during the Suez Crisis (collusion between France and Israel, and concealment vis-à-vis the United States), Israel’s 2007 bombing of Syria’s al Kibar reactor (compartmentalization), and Israel’s deliberations whether to attack Iran’s nuclear reactor (lying). These strategies have implications for intra-alliance restraint and contribute to understanding deception and secrecy between allies.


Book Chapters

The United States: Escalating to Assassination from the Cold War to the Present (chapter in volume: Killing in the Name of the State: State-Sponsored Assassination in International Politics, Lynne Rienner Publishers, December 2025)

This chapter examines what the Church Committee investigations can elucidate about the conditions under which the United States chose to pursue state-sponsored assassinations during the early Cold War. The chapter examines the Church Committee report on assassinations to determine which factors were most important in escalating U.S. foreign policy toward assassination. It considers factors including the danger of Communist spillover to nearby states, availability of intelligence assets in the target country, availability of friendly replacement if the targeted leader is extinguished, and strength of domestic opposition groups. The chapter then engages in process tracing of two incidents in which the United States implemented an assassination operation against a foreign leader: the killing of Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of Congo, in 1961, and the AMLASH operation against the Cuban leader Fidel Castro. To construct these case studies, I examine the Church Committee reports, testimonies, and attached documents, other declassified primary documents, and secondary histories and memoirs. Rather than attempt to determine conditions of success for assassination plots, this chapter reveals when the U.S. was likely to engage in this extreme covert activity, directly or enabling domestic groups. I then apply my historical findings to the Global War on Terror and the killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani during the Trump administration. I find that in light of the tightening restrictions on extrajudicial killing, anti-Communist motivations give way to the importance of plausible legality in planning modern assassinations.

Israel’s Mossad and Covert Action: Immigration, Counter-Proliferation, and Assassination (chapter in volume: Covert Action: National Approaches to Unacknowledged Intervention, Georgetown University Press, November 2025)

Israel’s approach to covert action is framed by its history and geography, resulting in covert actions that emphasize deterrence through implausible deniability. Israel’s covert action capability is unique in several ways: First, Israel prioritized immigration, in which clandestine assistance was provided for Jewish refugees who sought to immigrate to Israel. Second, cooperation within the Israeli intelligence community focuses on countering Arab terrorism. Israel also works to deny and disrupt technological development, particularly nuclear proliferation, of its adversaries. Most controversially, “targeted killing” and assassination have been a longstanding practice of Israeli covert action. Israel’s reliance on assassination derives from its need to use its resources as a small state strategically and respond to the fears of Israel’s leaders and citizens that is constantly under threat of annihilation. Perpetuation of the “Mossad Myth” is used to enhance deterrence while minimizing the escalation and retaliation risk from Israel’s adversaries.


Reviews

David V. Gioe and Michael J. Morell, “Spy and Tell: The Promise and Peril of Disclosing Intelligence for Strategic Advantage,” Foreign Affairs 7:4 (2024): 138-152, H-Diplo, RJISSF Roundtable 17-5. 2025. https://issforum.org/roundtables/jervis-forum-roundtable-17-5-on-gioe-and-morell-spy-and-tell

The President’s Kill List: Assassination and US Foreign Policy since 1945 by Luca Trenta, The RUSI Journal170(1), 80–82 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2025.2458939

G-Man: J. Edgar Hoover and the Making of the American Century by Beverly Gage, H-Diplo, RJISSF Roundtable 16-7. 2024. https://issforum.org/roundtables/h-diplo-rjissf-roundtable-16-7-on-gage-g-man

Secrets in Global Governance: Disclosure Dilemmas and the Challenge of International Cooperation by Allison Carnegie and Austin Carson, H-Diplo, RJISSF Roundtable 15-52. 2024. https://networks.h-net.org/group/discussions/20038416/h-diplorjissf-roundtable-15-52-carnegie-and-carson-secrets-global

Fire Alarm: The Investigation of the U.S. House Select Committee on Benghazi by Bradley F. Podliska. H-War, H-Net Reviews. 2023. https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=59456


Commentary

Melinda Haas, “Labeling dissent as terrorism: New US domestic terrorism priorities raise constitutional alarms,” The Conversation (December 3, 2025), https://theconversation.com/labeling-dissent-as-terrorism-new-us-domestic-terrorism-priorities-raise-constitutional-alarms-269161 (https://doi.org/10.64628/AAI.yj6y6mvwm)

Interview with DW News on pager and walkie-talkie explosions in Lebanon (September 18, 2024), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=krksU6WkFGE&t=195s

“Studying Covert Action” Panel, Israeli Forum for Intelligence Studies (July 11, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dYk3LQA5Tjs

“States Sharing Secrets: To Collude, Compartmentalize, Deceive, or Lie?” Bunker’s Cable Podcast, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh (June 2, 2022), https://open.spotify.com/episode/3ahYty01az0xQiqpqtnweH?si=hmNI5yYbQj6yn6eRKpMLsQ&nd=1.

Participant on GSPIA Faculty Panel on Ukraine (March 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZfJRKXUuxEM.

Michael Poznansky and Mindy Haas, “As US-China Competition Grows, Will Covert Regime Change Make a Return?” The Diplomat (2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/as-us-china-competition-grows-will-covert-regime-change-make-a-return/.